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Who do you blame in local finance? An analysis of municipal financing in Italy

  • Massimo Bordignon

    ()

    (DISCE, Università Cattolica)

  • Santino Piazza

    ()

    (DISCE, Università Cattolica)

A 1999 reform allowed Italian Mayors to partially substitute a more accountable source of tax revenue (the property tax) with a less trans- parent one (a surcharge on the personal income tax). Theoretical anal- ysis suggests this should give incompetent Mayors a less costly way to hide themselves, so allowing them to be more easily re-elected. An em- pirical analysis on Piedmont municipalities conrms these hypotheses.

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File URL: http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/EconomiaFinanza/Quaderni/ief0094.pdf
File Function: First version, 2010
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Paper provided by Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE) in its series DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza with number ief0094.

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Length: 51
Date of creation: May 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie3:ief0094
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/EconomiaFinanza
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  17. Besley, Timothy, 2007. "Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199283910, March.
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