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The influence of tax labeling and tax earmarking on the willingness to contribute: A conjoint analysis

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  • Hundsdoerfer, Jochen
  • Sielaff, Christian
  • Blaufus, Kay
  • Kiesewetter, Dirk
  • Weimann, Joachim

Abstract

We apply conjoint analysis to study the influence of tax labeling and tax earmarking on German taxpayers' willingness to contribute. From a survey based sample we show that labeling and earmarking effects can substantially increase participants' willingness to contribute, which results in a considerable deviation from a pure consumption maximizing behavior. Furthermore, we give an explanation for this effect regarding socio-demographic attributes of German taxpayers. These results explain the variety in tax labels and provide implications for tax policy regarding further reforms of the tax and contribution system: Labeling and earmarking of contributions are important instruments in selling policies and increasing tax revenue.

Suggested Citation

  • Hundsdoerfer, Jochen & Sielaff, Christian & Blaufus, Kay & Kiesewetter, Dirk & Weimann, Joachim, 2011. "The influence of tax labeling and tax earmarking on the willingness to contribute: A conjoint analysis," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 121, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:arqudp:121
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    Cited by:

    1. Runnemark, Emma & Hedman, Jonas & Xiao, Xiao, 2014. "Do Consumers Pay More Using Debit Cards than Cash? An Experiment," Working Papers 2014:21, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    2. Fochmann, Martin & Kroll, Eike B., 2014. "The effects of rewards on tax compliance decisions," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 163, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Behavioral Taxation; Tax Labeling; Tax Earmarking; Willingness to Contribute; Conjoint Analysis; Perceived Tax Burden;

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law

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