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Electoral competition with environmental policy as a second best transfer

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  • Kawahara, Shinya

Abstract

Abstract This paper explains why some governments fail to adopt policies that are sufficiently strong, while others adopt policies that are too stringent. Constructing a political economy model in which voters face uncertainty due to the types of politicians and the risk of environmental damage, we show that there is an equilibrium in which a politician uses a weaker environmental policy rather than efficient direct transfers for redistribution. We also show that there is an equilibrium in which a stricter environmental policy can be implemented by a politician who has no incentive to make transfers. Then, we discuss which equilibrium should be more plausible. We conclude that the latter equilibrium in which a too stringent environmental policy emerges can dominate the former unless the citizen's estimate of environmental risk is sufficiently low.

Suggested Citation

  • Kawahara, Shinya, 2011. "Electoral competition with environmental policy as a second best transfer," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 477-495, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:33:y:2011:i:3:p:477-495
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Urpelainen, 2012. "How do electoral competition and special interests shape the stringency of renewable energy standards?," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(1), pages 23-34, January.
    2. Alesina, Alberto & Passarelli, Francesco, 2014. "Regulation versus taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 147-156.
    3. McKitrick, Ross & Lee, Jamie, 2017. "Forming a Majority Coalition for Carbon Taxes under a State-Contingent Updating Rule," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, pages 289-309.

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