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Product standards, trade disputes, and protectionism

Author

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  • Daniel Sturm

Abstract

Disputes over national product standards are a major source of tension in international trade negotiations. The usual pattern is that exporters challenge new product standards as a `disguised barrier to trade.' The paper develops a two-country political agency model of standard setting. It is shown that there exists a political equilibrium in which the importing country on average applies a more stringent standard than the exporting country. This difference can be due either to a too lax standard in the exporting country or a too stringent standard in the importing country.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Sturm, 2006. "Product standards, trade disputes, and protectionism," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(2), pages 564-581, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:39:y:2006:i:2:p:564-581
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0008-4085.2006.00360.x
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    JEL classification:

    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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