Product Standards, Trade Disputes and Protectionism
Trade disputes over national product standards are a growing source of tension in the international trading system. The usual pattern is that a country introduces a new product standard for all sales of a good in its local market, which is justified as necessary for consumer or environmental protection. Importers into the local market, however, challenge the standard as a 'disguised barrier to trade' or 'green protectionism'. The paper develops a two country political economy model to explain such disputes. It is shown how the political process can lead to a 'political failure' which takes the form of either too many or too few product standards and disagreement between politicians in different countries over the optimal policy. In a second step the model is used to evaluate whether two common proposals to settle or avoid such disputes, mutual recognition of standards and harmonization, can improve the political process.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2001|
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- Stephen Nickell & Patricia Jones & Glenda Quintini, 2002.
"A Picture of Job Insecurity Facing British Men,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 1-27, January.
- Nickell, Stephen & Jones, Tracy & Quintini, Glenda, 2000. "A picture of job insecurity facing British men," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20141, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Patricia Tracy Jones & Stephen Nickell & Glenda Quintini, 2000. "A Picture of Job Insecurity Facing British Men," CEP Discussion Papers dp0479, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1995.
"Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 769-798.
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1993. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," NBER Working Papers 4575, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Burgess, Simon & Turon, Helene, 2000.
"Unemployment dynamics, duration and equilibrium: evidence from Britain,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
20162, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Simon Burgess & H Turon, 2000. "Unemployment Dynamics, Duration and Equilibrium: Evidence from Britain," CEP Discussion Papers dp0474, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Burgess, Simon & Turon, Hélène, 2000. "Unemployment Dynamics, Duration and Equilibrium: Evidence from Britain," CEPR Discussion Papers 2490, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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