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Pollution Tax under Lobbying Duopolists

  • Satoshi Honma

    ()

    (Faculty of Economics, Kyushu Sangyo University)

We study a model which explains a politically determined pollution tax outcome under asymmetric duopoly. We assume an asymmetry of firms in the pollution emissions per unit of output. The polluting duopoly and three-stage political game are considered. We derive the equilibrium tax rate and show that it might excess the marginal external damages, even without an environmental group. The politically determined tax rate is decomposed to the marginal external damages, the imperfect competition effect, and the lobbying effect. Under linear demand and cost functions, we derive the condition that Pigouvian taxation is politically determined. The effect on the equilibrium tax of firm heterogeneity is discussed.

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File URL: http://www.ip.kyusan-u.ac.jp/keizai-kiyo/dp22.pdf
File Function: First version, 2005
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Paper provided by Kyushu Sangyo University, Faculty of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 22.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kyu:dpaper:22
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  1. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
  2. Fredriksson, Per G. & Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Political instability, corruption and policy formation: the case of environmental policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1383-1405, August.
  3. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
  4. Per G. Fredriksson, 1999. "The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization and Environmental Policy," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 513-535, January.
  5. Richard Damania, 2003. "Protectionist Lobbying and Strategic Investment," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 79(244), pages 57-69, 03.
  6. Aidt, T.S.Toke Skovsgaard & Dutta, Jayasri, 2004. "Transitional politics: emerging incentive-based instruments in environmental regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 458-479, May.
  7. Fredriksson, Per G., 1997. "The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 44-58, May.
  8. Aidt, Toke S., 1998. "Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-16, July.
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