Optimal Linear Taxation of Polluting Oligopolists
A linear ad valorem tax can induce homogeneous oligopolists to produce at socially optimal levels, achieving the first-best allocation, in the presence of external costs that vary exogenously with aggregate output. The optimal tax rate is independent of private cost functions and thus reduces informational requirements on the regulator. Alternatively, if the regulator knows marginal private costs but not the pattern of firms' conduct or the slope of the demand curve, an iterative implementation of the tax is possible. Both blockaded and endogenous entry are considered, as is strategic behavior by firms toward the regulator. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Volume (Year): 7 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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