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The Symmetry between Controlling Pollution by Price and Controlling It by Quantity

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  • John Pezzey

Abstract

Under ideally competitive conditions, both controlling pollution by price (using a combined charge-subsidy scheme) and controlling it by quantity (using a marketable permit scheme) can achieve short- and long-run efficiency and also political acceptability, provided that both schemes embody the same degree of environmental ownership. The resulting full symmetry between control by price and control by quantity, a symmetry overlooked in the literature because of the entry-exit assumptions automatically made for most subsidy schemes, allows a useful practical choice to be made between the two control systems.

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  • John Pezzey, 1992. "The Symmetry between Controlling Pollution by Price and Controlling It by Quantity," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 25(4), pages 983-991, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:25:y:1992:i:4:p:983-91
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