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Experts and activists: how information affects the demand for food irradiation

  • Hayes, D. J.
  • Fox, J. A.
  • Shogren, J. F.

Controlled experimental auctions can be used to elicit preferences for food products. We describe results from two series of experiments in which subjects revealed their willingness-to-pay for safer food. In one series, the risk reduction technology was not specified; in the other, it was identified as food irradiation. The results provide some evidence on the acceptability of food irradiation as a risk reduction technology.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VCB-45NPFBJ-3/2/80435ff5c4054a29988064f44207d370
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Food Policy.

Volume (Year): 27 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 185-193

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfpoli:v:27:y:2002:i:2:p:185-193
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/foodpol

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  1. Fox, John A. & Hayes, Dermot J. & Shogren, Jason F., 2002. "Consumer Preferences for Food Irradiation: How Favorable and Unfavorable Descriptions Affect Preferences for Irradiated Pork in Experimental Auctions," Staff General Research Papers 5207, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  2. Lusk, Jayson L. & Daniel, M. Scott & Mark, Darrell R. & Lusk, Christine L., 2000. "Alternative Calibration And Auction Institutions For Predicting Consumer Willingness-To-Pay For Non-Genetically Modified Corn Chips," 2000 Annual Meeting, June 29-July 1, 2000, Vancouver, British Columbia 36424, Western Agricultural Economics Association.
  3. Fox, John A. & Shogren, J. & Hayes, Dermot J. & Kliebenstein, James, 2003. "Cvm-X: Calibrating Contingent Values with Experimental Auction Markets," Staff General Research Papers 11935, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  4. Roosen, Jutta & Fox, John A. & Hennessy, David A. & Schreiber, Alan, 1998. "Consumers' Valuation Of Insecticide Use Restrictions: An Application To Apples," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 23(02), December.
  5. Shogren, Jason F. & Shin, Seung Youll & Hayes, Dermot J. & Kliebenstein, James, 1994. "Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept," Staff General Research Papers 701, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  6. Jason F. Shogren & John A. Fox, 1996. "Consumer Preferences for Fresh Food Items with Multiple Quality Attributes: Evidence from an Experimental Auction of Pork Chops," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(4), pages 916-923.
  7. Hayes, Dermot J. & Shogren, Jason F. & Shin, Seung Youll & Kliebenstein, James, 1995. "Valuing Food Safety in Experimental Auction Markets," Staff General Research Papers 835, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  8. John A. List & Jason F. Shogren, 1999. "Price Information and Bidding Behavior in Repeated Second-Price Auctions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(4), pages 942-949.
  9. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
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