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Alternative Calibration And Auction Institutions For Predicting Consumer Willingness-To-Pay For Non-Genetically Modified Corn Chips

  • Lusk, Jayson L.
  • Daniel, M. Scott
  • Mark, Darrell R.
  • Lusk, Christine L.

This study explores two important issues in experimental economics: calibration and auction institution. Consumer willingness-to-pay bids for corn chips made with non-genetically modified ingredients are elicited from a 1st price and 2nd price auction. Results suggest that responses to scale differential questions, in a survey, accurately predict consumer willingness-to-pay bids. The 2 nd price auction induces a greater percentage of marginal bidders to offer a positive bid than a 1st price auction. However, average bid levels in the 1st and 2nd price auctions were not statistically different from one other. In a small and unrepresentative sample, 70 percent of student participants were unwilling to pay to exchange a bag of genetically modified corn chips for a bag of non-genetically modified corn chips. However, 20 percent of respondents were willing to pay at least $0.25/oz for the exchange.

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File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/36424
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Paper provided by Western Agricultural Economics Association in its series 2000 Annual Meeting, June 29-July 1, 2000, Vancouver, British Columbia with number 36424.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ags:waeava:36424
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://waeaonline.org/

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  1. Cragg, John G, 1971. "Some Statistical Models for Limited Dependent Variables with Application to the Demand for Durable Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(5), pages 829-44, September.
  2. John A. Fox & Jason F. Shogren & Dermot J. Hayes & James B. Kliebenstein, 1998. "CVM-X: Calibrating Contingent Values with Experimental Auction Markets," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 80(3), pages 455-465.
  3. Shogren, Jason F. & Shin, Seung Youll & Hayes, Dermot J. & Kliebenstein, James, 1994. "Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept," Staff General Research Papers 701, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  4. Jason Shogren & John List & Michael Margolis, 1998. "Hypothetical-actual bid calibration of a multi-good auction," Framed Field Experiments 00171, The Field Experiments Website.
  5. List, John A. & Shogren, Jason F., 2002. "Calibration of Willingness-to-Accept," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 219-233, March.
  6. Shogren, Jason F. & List, John & Hayes, Dermot J., 2000. "Preference Learning in Consecutive Experimental Auctions," Staff General Research Papers 5023, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  7. Shogren, Jason F. & Cho, Sungwon & Koo, Cannon & List, John & Park, Changwon & Polo, Pablo & Wilhelmi, Robert, 2001. "Auction mechanisms and the measurement of WTP and WTA," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 97-109, April.
  8. Johannesson, Magnus, et al, 1999. "Calibrating Hypothetical Willingness to Pay Responses," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 21-32, April.
  9. Champ, Patricia A. & Bishop, Richard C. & Brown, Thomas C. & McCollum, Daniel W., 1997. "Using Donation Mechanisms to Value Nonuse Benefits from Public Goods," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 151-162, June.
  10. Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Buzby, Jean C. & Fox, John A. & Ready, Richard C. & Crutchfield, Stephen R., 1998. "Measuring Consumer Benefits Of Food Safety Risk Reductions," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 30(01), July.
  12. Roosen, Jutta & Fox, John A. & Hennessy, David A. & Schreiber, Alan, 1998. "Consumers' Valuation Of Insecticide Use Restrictions: An Application To Apples," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 23(02), December.
  13. Jason F. Shogren & John A. Fox, 1996. "Consumer Preferences for Fresh Food Items with Multiple Quality Attributes: Evidence from an Experimental Auction of Pork Chops," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(4), pages 916-923.
  14. Jason F. Shogren & John A. Fox & Dermot J. Hayes & Jutta Roosen, 1999. "Observed Choices for Food Safety in Retail, Survey, and Auction Markets," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1192-1199.
  15. Miranowski, John & Moschini, GianCarlo & Babcock, Bruce A. & Duffy, Michael & Wisner, Robert N. & Beghin, John C. & Hayes, Dermot J. & Lence, Sergio H. & Baumel, C. Phillip & Harl, Neil E., 1999. "Economic Perspectives on GMO Market Segregation," Staff General Research Papers 11407, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  16. Hayes, Dermot J. & Shogren, Jason F. & Shin, Seung Youll & Kliebenstein, James, 1995. "Valuing Food Safety in Experimental Auction Markets," Staff General Research Papers 835, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  17. John A. List, 2001. "Do Explicit Warnings Eliminate the Hypothetical Bias in Elicitation Procedures? Evidence from Field Auctions for Sportscards," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1498-1507, December.
  18. Shogren, Jason F. & Fox, John A. & Hayes, Dermot J. & Kliebenstein, James, 1994. "Bid Sensitivity in the Structure of the Vickrey Auction," Staff General Research Papers 10616, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  19. List, John A. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Calibration of the difference between actual and hypothetical valuations in a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 193-205, October.
  20. Jayson L. Lusk & John A. Fox & Ted C. Schroeder & James Mintert & Mohammad Koohmaraie, 2001. "In-Store Valuation of Steak Tenderness," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(3), pages 539-550.
  21. David Lucking-Reiley, 1999. "Using field experiments to test equivalence between auction formats: Magic on the internet," Framed Field Experiments 00183, The Field Experiments Website.
  22. Karen Blumenschein & Magnus Johannesson & Glenn C. Blomquist & Bengt Liljas & Richard M. O’Conor, 1998. "Experimental Results on Expressed Certainty and Hypothetical Bias in Contingent Valuation," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 169-177, July.
  23. Wiktor Adamowicz & Peter Boxall & Michael Williams & Jordan Louviere, 1998. "Stated Preference Approaches for Measuring Passive Use Values: Choice Experiments and Contingent Valuation," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 80(1), pages 64-75.
  24. Horowitz, John K. & McConnell, K. E., 2000. "Values elicited from open-ended real experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 221-237, March.
  25. John A. List & Jason F. Shogren, 1999. "Price Information and Bidding Behavior in Repeated Second-Price Auctions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(4), pages 942-949.
  26. Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November.
  27. John Loomis & Thomas Brown & Beatrice Lucero & George Peterson, 1997. "Evaluating the Validity of the Dichotomous Choice Question Format in Contingent Valuation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 10(2), pages 109-123, September.
  28. Cox, James C & Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1988. " Theory and Individual Behavior of First-Price Auctions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 61-99, March.
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