IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Experimental auction procedure: Impact on valuation of quality differentiated goods

  • Ty Feldkamp
  • Jayson Lusk
  • Ted Schroeder

Despite increased use of experimental auctions, a myriad of different procedures are being employed without formal consideration of how the procedures might affect results. The study investigates the effect of several procedural issues on valuation estimates from experimental auctions. Results indicate the second price auction generates higher valuations than English, Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM), and random nth price auctions, especially in latter bidding rounds, and that random nth price auction yields lower valuations than English and BDM auctions. We find that endowing subjects with a good prior to eliciting bids can have an impact on valuationsk, but the effect varies across auction mechanism.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://s3.amazonaws.com/fieldexperiments-papers/papers/00097.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by The Field Experiments Website in its series Artefactual Field Experiments with number 00097.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:feb:artefa:00097
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.fieldexperiments.com

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. John List, 2002. "Preference Reversals of a Different Kind: The 'More is Less' Phenomenon," Framed Field Experiments 00509, The Field Experiments Website.
  2. List, John A. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Calibration of the difference between actual and hypothetical valuations in a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 193-205, October.
  3. David Lucking-Reiley & John List, 2000. "Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment," Natural Field Experiments 00520, The Field Experiments Website.
  4. Fox, John A. & Shogren, J. & Hayes, Dermot J. & Kliebenstein, James, 2003. "Cvm-X: Calibrating Contingent Values with Experimental Auction Markets," Staff General Research Papers Archive 11935, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  5. Dermot J. Hayes & Jason F. Shogren & Seung Youll Shin & James B. Kliebenstein, 1995. "Valuing Food Safety in Experimental Auction Markets," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 77(1), pages 40-53.
  6. Jason F. Shogren & Dermot J. Hayes & James B. Kliebenstein & John A. Fox, 1994. "Bid Sensitivity and the Structure of the Vickrey Auction," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 76(5), pages 1089-1095.
  7. John List, 2003. "Using random nth price auctions to value non-market goods and services," Framed Field Experiments 00173, The Field Experiments Website.
  8. Jason Shogren & John List, 1999. "Price Information and Bidding Behavior in Repeated Second-Price Auctions," Natural Field Experiments 00526, The Field Experiments Website.
  9. Jayson L. Lusk & Jutta Roosen & John A. Fox, 2003. "Demand for Beef from Cattle Administered Growth Hormones or Fed Genetically Modified Corn: A Comparison of Consumers in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 85(1), pages 16-29.
  10. Jack Knetsch & Fang-Fang Tang & Richard Thaler, 2001. "The Endowment Effect and Repeated Market Trials: Is the Vickrey Auction Demand Revealing?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(3), pages 257-269, December.
  11. Cannon Koo & Changwon Park & Jason Shogren & John List & Pablo Polo & Robert Wilhelmi & Sungwon Cho, 2001. "Auction mechanisms and the measurement of WTP and WTA," Natural Field Experiments 00516, The Field Experiments Website.
  12. Shogren, Jason F. & List, John & Hayes, Dermot J., 2000. "Preference Learning in Consecutive Experimental Auctions," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5023, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  13. Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November.
  14. repec:feb:framed:0068 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Jason F. Shogren & John A. Fox, 1996. "Consumer Preferences for Fresh Food Items with Multiple Quality Attributes: Evidence from an Experimental Auction of Pork Chops," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(4), pages 916-923.
  16. Roosen, Jutta & Fox, John A. & Hennessy, David A. & Schreiber, Alan, 1998. "Consumers' Valuation Of Insecticide Use Restrictions: An Application To Apples," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 23(02), December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:feb:artefa:00097. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joe Seidel)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.