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Bid Sensitivity and the Structure of the Vickrey Auction

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  • Jason F. Shogren
  • Dermot J. Hayes
  • James B. Kliebenstein
  • John A. Fox

Abstract

A research study explored a version of economist W. Vickrey's second-price, sealed-bid auction used for the valuation of nonmarket goods. The sensitivity of revealed values generated by this variation were examined. A standard second-price auction with repeated market trials was compared to a random nth-price auction and a combinatorial private-collection auction with sequentially-revealed values. Results showed the consistency of revealed values in a low probability risk scenario.
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Suggested Citation

  • Jason F. Shogren & Dermot J. Hayes & James B. Kliebenstein & John A. Fox, 1994. "Bid Sensitivity and the Structure of the Vickrey Auction," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 76(5), pages 1089-1095.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:76:y:1994:i:5:p:1089-1095.
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