Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision
We analyze the effect of group size on public good provision under the Morgan (2000) lottery mechanism. For a pure public good, the lottery performs quite well as public good provision is found to increase in group size, even when the lottery prize is held constant. By contrast, for fully rival public goods, per capita provision is found to decrease in group size, even when the lottery prize is proportional to group size. Further, the per capita level of provision will approach zero when group size is sufficiently large. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 9 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (06)
Pages: 451-465
| Handle: | RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:9:y:2007:i:3:p:451-465 |
| Contact details of provider: | Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923 More information through EDIRC
|
| Order Information: | Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1097-3923 |
No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.