On the Efficient Provision of Public Goods by Means of Lotteries
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- Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2013. "On the Efficient Provision of Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," Ruhr Economic Papers 399, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
References listed on IDEAS
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- John Morgan, 2000. "Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 761-784.
- Kotchen, Matthew J., 2007. "Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in impure public good models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 91-96, November.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, November.
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- Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2007. "Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 451-465, June.
- Jörg Franke & Christian Kanzow & Wolfgang Leininger & Alexandra Schwartz, 2013. "Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(2), pages 589-630, March.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Giebe, Thomas & Schweinzer, Paul, 2014.
"Consuming your way to efficiency: Public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 1-12.
- Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2013. "Consuming your Way to Efficiency: Public Goods Provision through Non-Distortionary Tax Lotteries," CESifo Working Paper Series 4228, CESifo Group Munich.
- Sebastian J. Goerg & John P. Lightle & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2016.
"Priming The Charitable Pump: An Experimental Investigation Of Two-Stage Raffles,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(1), pages 508-519, January.
- Sebastian J. Goerg & John Lightle & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2013. "Priming the charitable pump: An experimental investigation of two-stage raffles," Working Papers wp2013_05_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
- Martin Kolmar & Dana Sisak, 2014. "(In)efficient public-goods provision through contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 239-259, June.
More about this item
Keywordspublic good provision; biased lotteries; charities;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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