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On the Efficient Provision of Public Goods by Means of Lotteries

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  • Franke, Jörg
  • Leininger, Wolfgang

Abstract

We provide a solution to the free-rider problem in the provision of a public good. To this end we define a biased indirect contribution game which provides the efficient amount of the public good in non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. No confiscatory taxes or other means of coercion are used. We rather extend the model of Morgan (2000), who used fair raffles as voluntary contribution schemes, to unfair or biased raffles, which we show to be equivalent to fair raffles whose tickets are sold to consumers at different individual prices. We give a detailed account of the solution for the case of two different consumers and discuss its implications for the general case of many consumers.

Suggested Citation

  • Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2013. "On the Efficient Provision of Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," Ruhr Economic Papers 399, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:rwirep:399
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kotchen, Matthew J., 2007. "Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in impure public good models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 91-96, November.
    2. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    3. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005. "Asymmetric contests with general technologies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
    4. John Morgan, 2000. "Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 761-784.
    5. Jörg Franke & Christian Kanzow & Wolfgang Leininger & Alexandra Schwartz, 2013. "Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(2), pages 589-630, March.
    6. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, September.
    7. Martin Kolmar & martin.kolmar@unisg.ch & Andreas Wagener, 2012. "Contests and the Private Production of Public Goods," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 161-179, July.
    8. Marco Faravelli, 2011. "The Important Thing Is Not (Always) Winning but Taking Part: Funding Public Goods with Contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(1), pages 1-22, February.
    9. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2007. "Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 451-465, June.
    10. Jacob K. Goeree & Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal & John L. Turner, 2005. "How (Not) to Raise Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 897-926, August.
    11. Duncan, Brian, 2002. "Pumpkin Pies and Public Goods: The Raffle Fundraising Strategy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 111(1-2), pages 49-71, March.
    12. Lange, Andreas, 2006. "Providing public goods in two steps," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 173-178, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sebastian J. Goerg & John P. Lightle & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2016. "Priming The Charitable Pump: An Experimental Investigation Of Two-Stage Raffles," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(1), pages 508-519, January.
    2. Giebe, Thomas & Schweinzer, Paul, 2014. "Consuming your way to efficiency: Public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 1-12.
    3. Martin Kolmar & Dana Sisak, 2014. "(In)efficient public-goods provision through contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 239-259, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    public good provision; biased lotteries; charities;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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