The efficient provision of public goods through non-distortionary tax contests
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KeywordsTaxation; Contests; Efficiency;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2011-03-12 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PBE-2011-03-12 (Public Economics)
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