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The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer

  • Che, Yeon-Koo
  • Gale, Ian

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-45FCBRN-1F/2/61030fb63ed6a7d643dfdcd187b130b2
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 92 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 198-233

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:92:y:2000:i:2:p:198-233
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Riley, John & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1983. "Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 267-89, May.
  2. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
  3. Raymond J. Deneckere & R. Preston McAfee, 1996. "Damaged Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(2), pages 149-174, 06.
  4. Wilson, Charles A, 1988. "On the Optimal Pricing Policy of a Monopolist," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 164-76, February.
  5. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1992. "Joint Bidding in Federal OCS Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 506-11, May.
  6. Milgrom, P. & Shannon, C., 1991. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Papers 11, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
  7. Faruk Gul & Hugo Sonnenschein & Robert Wilson, 2010. "Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture," Levine's Working Paper Archive 232, David K. Levine.
  8. David J. Salant, 1997. "Up in the Air: GTE's Experience in the MTA Auction for Personal Communication Services Licenses," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 549-572, 09.
  9. Wilson, Robert B, 1989. "Efficient and Competitive Rationing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 1-40, January.
  10. Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January.
  11. Jean-Charles Rochet & Philippe Chone, 1998. "Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 783-826, July.
  12. Katz, Michael L, 1984. "Nonuniform Pricing with Unobservable Numbers of Purchases," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 461-70, July.
  13. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1981. "A Theory of Monopoly Pricing Schemes with Demand Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 347-65, June.
  14. Arijit Sen, 1998. "Seller Financing of Consumer Durables," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 435-460, 09.
  15. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
  16. Stokey, Nancy L, 1979. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(3), pages 355-71, August.
  17. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1988. "Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 335-354, December.
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