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Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply

Author

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  • Yeon-Koo Che
  • Ian L. Gale

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Yeon-Koo Che & Ian L. Gale, 2006. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1355-1360, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:4:p:1355-1360
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.4.1355
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:ags:afjare:141665 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-651, June.
    3. Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
    4. Todd R. Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2006. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1351-1354, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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    Cited by:

    1. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1405, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
    2. repec:eee:mateco:v:74:y:2018:i:c:p:21-34 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Hirata, Daisuke, 2014. "A model of a two-stage all-pay auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 5-13.
    4. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    5. Ron Seigel, 2009. "Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000201, David K. Levine.
    6. Martin Gregor, 2011. "Corporate lobbying: A review of the recent literature," Working Papers IES 2011/32, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Nov 2011.
    7. Kline, Brendan, 2009. "A restriction on lobbyist donations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 129-132, September.
    8. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2009. "Caps on political contributions, monetary penalties and politician preferences," Working Papers 200912, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    9. Minoru Kitahara & Ryo Ogawa, 2010. "All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps," ISER Discussion Paper 0781, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2010.
    10. Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger, 2014. "All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 115-116, pages 361-377.
    11. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2010. "The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1251, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    12. Pastine, Ivan & Pastine, Tuvana, 2006. "Politician Preferences and Caps on Political Lobbying," CEPR Discussion Papers 5913, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2010. "Politician preferences, law-abiding lobbyists and caps on political contributions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 81-101, October.
    14. René Kirkegaard, 2007. "Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous Contests: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds," Working Papers 0702, Brock University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General

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