Equilibria in Second Price Auctions with Participation Costs
We investigate equilibria of sealed-bid second price auctions with bidder participation costs in the independent private values environment. We focus on equilibria in which bidders use cut-off strategies (bid the valuation if it is greater than a certain cut-off point, otherwise do not participate), since if a bidder finds participating optimal, she cannot do better than bidding her valuation. When the bidders are symmetric, the concavity (respectively, strict convexity) of the c.d.f. from which the valuations are drawn is a sufficient condition for uniqueness (respectively, multiplicity) within this class. We also study a special case with asymmetric bidders and show that concavity/convexity plays a similar role.
|Date of creation:||24 Jan 2004|
|Date of revision:||09 Jun 2006|
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