Buy-out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi-unit demands
Online auction sites often enable sellers to add a buy-out price. In one-shot auctions, this has been motivated by appeal to impatience or risk aversion. We offer additional justification in a dynamic model, by showing that an early seller has an incentive to use a buy-out price, if a similar product is offered later by another seller, and bidders desire multiple objects. Revenue in the first auction increases, but revenue in the second auction decreases, as does the sum of revenues. The buy-out price causes the auction sequence to become inefficient, because the first item may be awarded to a bidder who should have received none. Copyright (c) 2008, RAND.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 39 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 770-789
| Handle: | RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:3:p:770-789 |
| Contact details of provider: | Postal: 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, California 90407-2138 Phone: 310-393-0411 Fax: 310-393-4818 Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0741-6261 Email: More information through EDIRC
|
| Order Information: | Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0741-6261 |
No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.