Internet auctions with a temporary buyout option
We model an Internet auction with a temporary buyout option. Our main result shows that under certain parameter values, there exist two types of equilibria where offering a temporary buyout option with an appropriate reserve price enables the seller to increase expected revenue.
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Tan, Guofu & Yilankaya, Okan, 2004. "Equilibria in Second Price Auctions with Participation Costs," Microeconomics.ca working papers tan-04-01-24-10-08-06, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 09 Jun 2006.
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- John G. Riley, 2001. "Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 432-478, June.
- Timothy Mathews & Brett Katzman, 2006. "The role of varying risk attitudes in an auction with a buyout option," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(3), pages 597-613, 04.
- Hidvegi, Zoltan & Wang, Wenli & Whinston, Andrew B., 2006. "Buy-price English auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 31-56, July.
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