Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Daniel Garcia, 2017. "Dynamic Pricing with Search Frictions," Vienna Economics Papers 1703, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Marleen Marra, 2019. "Pricing and Fees in Auction Platforms with Two-Sided Entry," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers 2020-02, Sciences Po Departement of Economics.
- Matthew Backus & Gregory Lewis, 2016. "Dynamic Demand Estimation in Auction Markets," NBER Working Papers 22375, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Zhang, Hanzhe, 2019. "Prices versus Auctions in Large Markets," Working Papers 2019-13, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
- Marleen Marra, 2019. "Pricing and Fees in Auction Platforms with Two-Sided Entry," Sciences Po publications 2020-02, Sciences Po.
More about this item
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-COM-2016-03-29 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2016-03-29 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2016-03-29 (Marketing)
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