Dynamic Pricing with Search Frictions
This paper studies dynamic pricing in markets with search frictions. Sellers have a single unit of a good and post prices in every trading period. Buyers have to incur a search cost to match with a new seller and upon matching they observe the price and the realization of some idiosyncratic match value. There is no discounting but trade ends at an exogenously given deadline. We show that equilibrium involves trading in nitely many trading periods and the volume of trade increases over time. Under mild conditions on the buyerto- seller ratio and the distribution of valuations, prices decrease at increasing rates as the deadline approaches. We derive the gains from trade in equilibrium and their distribution between buyers and sellers. For the case in which the measures of buyers and sellers coincide, we provide a full characterization of the (unique) equilibrium for a class of distribution functions. We nally discuss implications for market design, including the use of platform fees and cancellation policies.
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- Maarten Janssen & Alexei Parakhonyak & Anastasia Parakhonyak, 2014. "Non-reservation price equilibria and Consumer search," HSE Working papers WP BRP 51/EC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
- Sandro Shelegia & Daniel Garcia, 2015. "Consumer Search with Observational Learning," Vienna Economics Papers 1502, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
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