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Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms

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  • David Bounies
  • Antoine Dubus
  • Patrick Waelbroeck

Abstract

We investigate the strategies of a data intermediary selling consumer information to firms for price discrimination purpose. We analyze how the mechanism through which the data intermediary sells information influences how much consumer information she will collect and sell to firms, and how it impacts consumer surplus. We consider three selling mechanisms tailored to sell consumer information: take it or leave it, sequential bargaining, and auctions. We show that the more information the intermediary collects, the lower consumer surplus. Consumer information collection is minimized, and consumer surplus maximized under the take it or leave it mechanism, which is the least profitable mechanism for the intermediary. We discuss two regulatory tools { a data minimization principle and a price cap { that can be used by data protection agencies and competition authorities to limit consumer information collection, increase consumer surplus, and ensure a fair access to information to firms.

Suggested Citation

  • David Bounies & Antoine Dubus & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2020. "Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms," Working Papers ECARES 2020-07, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  • Handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/303840
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    References listed on IDEAS

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