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Collecting and Selling Consumer Information: Selling Mechanisms Matter

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  • David Bounie

    (IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, SES - Département Sciences Economiques et Sociales - Télécom ParisTech, ECOGE - Economie Gestion - I3 SES - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation de Telecom Paris - Télécom ParisTech - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Antoine Dubus

    (D-MTEC - Department of Management, Technology, and Economics [ETH Zürich] - ETH Zürich - Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology [Zürich])

  • Patrick Waelbroeck

    (IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, SES - Département Sciences Economiques et Sociales - Télécom ParisTech, ECOGE - Economie Gestion - I3 SES - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation de Telecom Paris - Télécom ParisTech - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We study the strategies of a data intermediary collecting and selling information to competing firms under different selling mechanisms. We characterize the amount of data collected and sold as well as the price of information with posted prices, sequential bargaining, first-price and second-price auctions. We generalize pair-wise comparisons to establish the economic properties of classes of mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • David Bounie & Antoine Dubus & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2022. "Collecting and Selling Consumer Information: Selling Mechanisms Matter," Working Papers hal-02288708, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02288708
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02288708v6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Rodrigo Montes & Wilfried Sand-Zantman & Tommaso Valletti, 2019. "The Value of Personal Information in Online Markets with Endogenous Privacy," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(3), pages 1342-1362, March.
    3. Matthew Backus & Thomas Blake & Steven Tadelis, 2019. "On the Empirical Content of Cheap-Talk Signaling: An Application to Bargaining," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1599-1628.
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    5. David Bounie & Antoine Dubus & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2018. "Selling Strategic Information in Digital Competitive Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 7078, CESifo.
    6. John Riley & Richard Zeckhauser, 1983. "Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(2), pages 267-289.
    7. Thisse, Jacques-Francois & Vives, Xavier, 1988. "On the Strategic Choice of Spatial Price Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 122-137, March.
    8. Matthew Backus & Thomas Blake & Jett Pettus & Steven Tadelis, 2020. "Communication and Bargaining Breakdown: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 27984, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Paul R. Milgrom & Steven Tadelis, 2018. "How Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Can Impact Market Design," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda, pages 567-585, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. David Bounie & Antoine Dubus & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2018. "Selling Strategic Information in Digital Competitive Markets," Working Papers hal-01794886, HAL.
    11. Stole, Lars A., 2007. "Price Discrimination and Competition," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 34, pages 2221-2299, Elsevier.
    12. Joel Sobel & Ichiro Takahashi, 1983. "A Multistage Model of Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(3), pages 411-426.
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    Cited by:

    1. Antoine Dubus, 2023. "Behavior-Based Algorithmic Pricing," Working Papers hal-03269586, HAL.

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