Auctions vs. Negotiations
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- Bulow, Jeremy I. & Klemperer, Paul, 1994. "Auctions vs. Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers 924, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014.
"Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2007.
"Auctions and information acquisition: sealed bid or dynamic formats?,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 355-372, June.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2005. "Auctions and Information acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000495, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2007. "Auctions and Informaton Acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats?," Post-Print halshs-00754227, HAL.
- Ken Binmore & Paul Klemperer, 2002.
"The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences,"
Economic Journal,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages 74-96, March.
- Ken Binmore & Paul Klemperer, 2001. "The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses," Economics Papers 2002-W4, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, revised 01 Sep 2001.
- Binmore, Kenneth & Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences," CEPR Discussion Papers 3214, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Jesse A, 2000.
"Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics,
Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 229-252, May.
- Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2000. "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 00jre, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Mar 1999.
- Klemperer, Paul, 2000.
"Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory," Microeconomics 0004009, EconWPA.
- Roberto Burguet, 2000.
"Auction theory: a guided tour,"
Investigaciones Economicas,
Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(1), pages 3-50, January.
- Burguet, R., 1998. "Auction Theory: a Guided Tour," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 422.98, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Michael Peters, 1997. "Surplus Extraction and Competition," Working Papers peters-97-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1998. "The Optimality of Being Efficient," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpoe, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 18 Jun 1999.
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2011.
"On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(1), pages 1-36, March.
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000222, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Working Papers 08-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001789, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Michael Peters, 1999.
"Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(3), pages 273-292.
- Michael Peters, 1996. "Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment," Working Papers peters-96-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Boeheim, Rene & Zulehner, Christine, 1996. "Auctions - A Survey," Economics Series 39, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1997. "Auctioning Securities," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpas, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised Mar 1998.
- Vlad Mares & Ronald Harstad, 2007.
"Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly,"
Economic Theory,
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(2), pages 399-410, August.
- Ronald M. Harstad & Vlad Mares, 2005. "Ex-Post Full Surplus Extraction, Straightforwardly," Working Papers 0515, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
- Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997.
"An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information 9409002, EconWPA.
- Tim Grebe & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Sabine Kröger, 2009.
"Buy-it-Now Prices in eBay Auctions-The Field in the Lab,"
Cahiers de recherche
0950, CIRPEE.
- Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Grebe, Tim & Kröger, Sabine, 2014. "Buy-it-Now Prices in eBay Auctions The Field in the Lab," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100611, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Grebe, Tim & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kröger, Sabine, 2010. "Buy-It-Now prices in eBay Auctions - The Field in the Lab," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 294, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Klemperer, Paul, 2002.
"Some Observations on the British and German 3G Telecom Auctions,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3605, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paul Klemperer, 2002. "Some Observations on the British and German 3G Telecom Auctions," Economics Papers 2002-W20, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- World Bank, 2003. "Unsolicited Proposals : The Issues for Private Infrastructure Projects," World Bank Other Operational Studies 11305, The World Bank.
- Miguel Vazquez & Michelle Hallack, 2017. "Efficiency versus transaction costs in multidimensional auctions: the case of Brazilian oil and gas lease auctions," IEFE Working Papers 94, IEFE, Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- McAfee, R. Preston & Vincent, Daniel, 1997.
"Sequentially Optimal Auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 246-276, February.
- R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent, 1994. "Sequentially Optimal Auctions," Discussion Papers 1104, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Koc, Umit & Erdogdu, Oya Safinaz, 2005.
"Türk Telekom A.Ş.’nin Özelleştirilmesi: Oyun Teorisi Perspektifinden Bir Değerlendirme
[Privatization of Turkish Telecom Company: An Assessment from Game Theory Perspective]," MPRA Paper 72143, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2004. - Alexander Galetovic & Juan Ricardo Inostroza, 2004. "Transmisión eléctrica y la “ley corta”: por qué licitar es (mucho) mejor que regular (Electricity transmission and the short law: why offering for tender is [much] better than regulation)," Documentos de Trabajo 177, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Quintero Jaramillo, Jose E., 2004. "Liquidity constraints and credit subsidies in auctions," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB wb040604, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
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