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Optimal Auctions Revisited

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  • Engelbrecht-Wiggans Richard

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  • Engelbrecht-Wiggans Richard, 1993. "Optimal Auctions Revisited," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 227-239, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:2:p:227-239
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bulow, Jeremy I. & Klemperer, Paul, 1994. "Auctions vs. Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers 924, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1544-1575, September.
    3. Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2002. "(Sub-)Optimal Entry Fees," Working Papers. Serie AD 2002-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    4. Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Timothy C. Salmon, 2004. "Bidder Preferences among Auction Institutions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(2), pages 223-236, April.
    5. salant, david j, 2010. "Sequential auction and auction design," MPRA Paper 30022, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Salmon, Timothy C., 2006. "Anomalies in Auction Choice Behavior," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 174, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    7. Menezes, Flavio Marques & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, 2001. "Why do Bidders Drop Out from a Sequential Auction," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil), vol. 55(1), January.
    8. Kaplan, Todd & Sela, Aner, 2003. "Auctions with Private Entry Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 4080, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Antonio Miralles, 2005. "Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition," Working Papers in Economics 132, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    10. Flavio Menezes & Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 1996. "A Note on Auctions with Endogenous Participation," Microeconomics 9610003, EconWPA, revised 31 Oct 1996.
    11. Moen, Espen R & Riis, Christian, 2005. "Efficient Exclusion," CEPR Discussion Papers 5257, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Jeremy I. Bulow & Paul D. Klemperer, 2007. "When are Auctions Best?," NBER Working Papers 13268, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Salmon, Timothy C., 2008. "Revenue equivalence revisited," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 171-192, September.
    14. Egil Kjerstad, 2005. "Auctions vs negotiations: a study of price differentials," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(12), pages 1239-1251.
    15. Ye, Lixin & Zhang, Chenglin, 2017. "Monopolistic nonlinear pricing with consumer entry," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.

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