A Note on the Suboptimality of Right-of-First-Refusal Clauses
We show that, under independent private values, no mechanism that contains a right-of-first-refusal clause can maximize the sum of the utilities of the seller and the right-holder.
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|Date of creation:||Jul 2006|
|Date of revision:||Jul 2006|
|Publication status:||Published in Economic Bulletin, Vol.4, No. 24, pp. 1-5|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Vito Dumas 284, Victoria, Buenos Aires, B1644BID|
Web page: http://www.udesa.edu.ar
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- Naegelen, Florence & Mougeot, Michel, 1998. "Discriminatory public procurement policy and cost reduction incentives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 349-367, March.
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