Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-des/2026-01-19.html
Report NEP-DES-2026-01-19
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2025, "Calibrated Mechanism Design," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2512.17858, Dec, revised Feb 2026.
- Beuermann, Diether & Pariguana, Marco, 2025, "Constrained School Choice and the Demand for Effective Schools," IDB Publications (Working Papers), Inter-American Development Bank, number 14455, Dec, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0013875.
- Dinko Dimitrov & Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2025, "Incomplete Information and Matching of Likes: A Mechanism Design Approach," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2512.18764, Dec.
- Muhammed Ceesay & Nicola Doni & Domenico Menicucci, 2026, "Investments in First-Price and Second-Price Procurement Auctions," Working Papers - Economics, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, number wp2026_01.rdf.
- Hiroto Sato & Ryo Shirakawa, 2025, "Allocating Common-Value Goods," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2512.20001, Dec, revised Apr 2026.
- Ernesto Rivera Mora & Philipp Strack, 2025, "Information Without Rents: Mechanism Design Without Expected Utility," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2481, Dec.
- Dirk Bergemann & Marek Bojko & Paul DŸtting & Renato Paes Leme & Haifeng Xu & Song Zuo, 2025, "Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2418R2, Dec.
- Bonifacio Agustín Germán & Amieva Adriana & Neme Pablo, 2025, "Mechanisms for a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política, number 4780, Dec.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Julien Grenet & Yinghua He, 2025, "Allocating Students to Schools: Theory, Methods, and Empirical Insights," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2512.20353, Dec.
- Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2025, "Procurement without Priors: A Simple Mechanism and its Notable Performance," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2479, Dec.
- Job Boerma & Andrea Ottolini & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2025, "Multidimensional Sorting: Comparative Statics," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2480, Dec.
- Gabrielli Maria Florencia & Aryal Gaurab & Fajnzilber Eduardo & Willington Manuel, 2025, "Auctioning Annuities with Two Sided Private Information," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política, number 4804, Dec.
- Jussi Keppo & Yingkai Li, 2025, "Three Tiers and Thresholds: Incentives in Private Market Investing," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2512.19405, Dec.
- Jason Allen & Ali Hortaçsu & Eric Richert & Milena Wittwer, 2026, "Entry and Exit in Treasury Auctions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 34646, Jan.