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Incomplete Information and Matching of Likes: A Mechanism Design Approach

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  • Dinko Dimitrov
  • Dipjyoti Majumdar

Abstract

We study the implementability of stable matchings in a two-sided market model with one-sided incomplete information. Firms' types are publicly known, whereas workers' types are private information. A mechanism generates a matching and additional announcements to the firms at each report profile of workers' types. When agents' preferences are increasing in the types of their matched partner, we show that the assortative matching mechanism which publicly announces the entire set of reported types is incentive compatible. Furthermore, any mechanism that limits information disclosure to firms' lower contour sets of reported types remains incentive compatible. However, when information is incomplete on both sides of the market, assortative matching is no longer implementable.

Suggested Citation

  • Dinko Dimitrov & Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2025. "Incomplete Information and Matching of Likes: A Mechanism Design Approach," Papers 2512.18764, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2512.18764
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.18764
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