The Economics of Large Language Models: Token Allocation, Fine-Tuning, and Optimal Pricing
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05308118v1
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin, 2025. "The Economics of Large Language Models: Token Allocation, Fine Tuning, and Optimal Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2425, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin, 2025. "The Economics of Large Language Models: Token Allocation, Fine-Tuning, and Optimal Pricing," Papers 2502.07736, arXiv.org.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Bonatti, Alessandro & Smolin, Alex, 2025. "The Economics of Large Language Models: Token Allocation, Fine-Tuning, and Optimal Pricing," TSE Working Papers 25-1670, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Simone Vannuccini, 2025.
"Move fast and integrate things: The making of a European Industrial Policy for Artificial Intelligence,"
MIOIR Working Paper Series
2025-02, The Manchester Institute of Innovation Research (MIoIR), The University of Manchester.
- Simone Vannuccini, 2025. "Move Fast and Integrate Things: The Making of a European Industrial Policy for Artificial Intelligence," GREDEG Working Papers 2025-21, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
- Gillian K. Hadfield & Andrew Koh, 2025. "An Economy of AI Agents," Papers 2509.01063, arXiv.org.
- Gillian K. Hadfield & Andrew Koh, 2025. "An Economy of AI Agents," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Transformative AI, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Bonatti, Alessandro & Wu, Nicholas, 2025. "Bidding with budgets: Data-driven bid algorithms in digital advertising," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
More about this item
Keywords
; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05308118. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/wpaper/hal-05308118.html