Discriminatory Information Disclosure
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- Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2017. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3363-3385, November.
- Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2017. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," Working Papers tecipa-583, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Sequential Screening; Discriminatory Disclosure; Price Discrimination; Dynamic Mechanism Design;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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