Ex post information rents and disclosure in sequential screening
We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agentâ€™s ex ante information is discrete, these rents are positive, whereas they are zero in continuous models. Consequently, full disclosure of ex post information is generally suboptimal. Optimal disclosure rules trade off the benefits from adapting the allocation to better information against the effect that more information aggravates truth-telling.
|Date of creation:||09 Aug 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nocke, Volker & Peitz, Martin, 2008.
"Advance-Purchase Discounts as a Price Discrimination Device,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6664, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Nocke, Volker & Peitz, Martin & Rosar, Frank, 2011. "Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 141-162, January.
- Pascal Courty & Li Hao, 1997.
Economics Working Papers
224, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Ralph Boleslavsky & Maher Said, 2011.
"Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process,"
2011-5, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Raphael Boleslavsky & Maher Said, 2013. "Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 1-34.
- Baron, David P. & Besanko, David, 1984. "Regulation and information in a continuing relationship," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 267-302.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986.
"Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-41, June.
- Myerson, Roger B, 1986.
"Multistage Games with Communication,"
Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-58, March.
- Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2011.
"Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 78(3), pages 1015-1041.
- Daniel Krämer & Roland Strausz, 2009. "Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre--Project Planning," Papers 036, Departmental Working Papers.
- Marco Battaglini, 2003.
"Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers,"
Theory workshop papers
505798000000000048, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman, 2011. "Pre-sale information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2333-2355.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:406. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tamilla Benkelberg)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.