IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Optimal Sequential Delegation

  • Kovác, Eugen
  • Krähmer, Daniel

The paper extends the optimal delegation framework pioneered by Holmström (1977, 1984) to a dynamic environment where, at the outset, the agent privately knows his ability to interpret decision relevant private information received later on. We show that any mechanism can be implemented by a sequential menu of delegation sets where the agent first picks a delegation set and then chooses an action within this set. For the uniform{quadratic case, we characterize when sequential delegation is strictly better than static delegation and derive the optimal delegation menu. We provide sufficient conditions so that our results extend beyond the uniform distribution.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17331/1/427.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 427.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 11 Apr 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:427
Contact details of provider: Postal: Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-3405
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3510
Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Alonso, Ricardo & Dessein, Wouter & Matouschek, Niko, 2006. "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5802, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Dezsö SZALAY, 2003. "The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 03.09, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  3. Helmut Bester, . "Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights," Papers 027, Departmental Working Papers.
  4. Peitz, Martin & Inderst, Roman, 2012. "Informing Consumers about their own Preferences," Working Papers 12-07, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
  5. Alonso, Ricardo & Matouschek, Niko, 2005. "Optimal Delegation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5289, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Nocke, Volker & Peitz, Martin, 2008. "Advance-Purchase Discounts as a Price Discrimination Device," CEPR Discussion Papers 6664, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Bargaining in the Appointment Process, Constrained Delegation and the Political Weight of the Senate," MPRA Paper 6988, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. repec:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:3:p:503-520 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Marco Ottaviani & Francesco Squintani, 2006. "Naive audience and communication bias," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 129-150, December.
  10. Chifeng Dai & Tracy R. Lewis & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2006. "Delegating management to experts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 503-520, 09.
  11. Aggey Semenov, 2012. "Delegation to a potentially uninformed agent," Working Papers 1215E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  12. Krahmer, Daniel, 2006. "Message-contingent delegation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 490-506, August.
  13. Baron, David P. & Besanko, David, 1984. "Regulation and information in a continuing relationship," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 267-302.
  14. Courty, Pascal & Li, Hao, 2000. "Sequential Screening," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(4), pages 697-717, October.
  15. Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2008. "Veto-based delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 297-307, January.
  16. Semenov, Aggey, 2012. "Delegation to potentially uninformed agent," MPRA Paper 42080, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Marco Battaglini, 2005. "Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 637-658, June.
  18. Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2011. "Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(3), pages 1015-1041.
  19. Kartik, Navin & Ottaviani, Marco & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Credulity, lies, and costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 93-116, May.
  20. Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
  21. Ricardo Alonso & Wouter Dessein & Niko Matouschek, 2008. "When Does Coordination Require Centralization? Corrigendum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 1195-96, June.
  22. Wouter Dessein, 2000. "Authority and Communication in Organizations," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1747, Econometric Society.
  23. Krahmer Daniel & Strausz Roland, 2008. "Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-27, October.
  24. Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman, 2011. "Pre-sale information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2333-2355.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:427. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandra Frank)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.