Delegation to a potentially uninformed agent
We consider a delegation problem with a biased and potentially uninformed agent when the principal cannot use monetary payments. If the bias between the principal and the agent is large then the optimal delegation set is an interval. When the bias is small or medium the optimal delegation set is no longer connected. It can be one of two types: 1) with an interval and low option, 2) with two intervals. In all cases the agent has less discretion. However, in the case of medium bias the principal delegates in a wider range than in the case of an informed agent
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