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Discriminatory Information Disclosure

Listed author(s):
  • Hao Li
  • Xianwen Shi
Registered author(s):

    A seller designs a mechanism to sell a single object to a potential buyer whose private type is his incomplete information about his valuation. The seller can disclose additional information to the buyer about his valuation without observing its realization. In both discrete-type and continuous-type settings, we show that discriminatory disclosure - releasing different amounts of additional information to different buyer types - dominates full disclosure in terms of seller revenue. An implication is that the orthogonal decomposition technique, while an important tool in dynamic mechanism design, is generally invalid when information disclosure is part of the design.

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    File URL: https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/tecipa-583.pdf
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    Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number tecipa-583.

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    Length: Unknown pages
    Date of creation: 29 May 2017
    Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-583
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    1. Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2016. "Persuasion Of A Privately Informed Receiver," Working Papers 2016_22, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    2. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2015. "Ex post information rents in sequential screening," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 257-273.
    3. Borgers, Tilman & Krahmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2015. "An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199734023.
    4. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721, August.
    5. Goltsman, Maria & Hörner, Johannes & Pavlov, Gregory & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Mediation, arbitration and negotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1397-1420, July.
    6. Zhang, Jun, 2013. "Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 452-461.
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