Adverse Selection in the Wholesale Used Car Market
This paper presents an empirical investigation of adverse selection in the wholesale used car market. New car dealers (who sell both new and used cars) differ from used car dealers (who sell only used cars) in the propensity to sell trade-ins on the wholesale market. Models of adverse selection suggest that the dealer type that sells a higher proportion of its trade-ins on the wholesale market will sell, on average, cars of higher quality and receive in return a higher price. A survey of dealers' wholesale behavior and prices collected at a wholesale auction are used to test this prediction. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:101:y:1993:i:4:p:644-65. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.