No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
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- Joseph M. Ostroy & Uzi Segal, 2010. "No Externalities: A Characterization of Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility with Public Goods," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 769, Boston College Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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