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Minimal envy and popular matchings

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  • Kondratev, Aleksei Y.
  • Nesterov, Alexander S.

Abstract

We study ex-post fairness and efficiency in the object allocation problem. A matching is individually fair if it minimizes the number of envying agents, we call it minimal envy matching, and conditional on being minimal envy also minimizes the number of envying agents in a reduced problem, we call it minimal envy-2 matching. A matching is socially fair if supported by the majority of agents against any other matching – popular matching. We observe that when a popular matching exists it is equivalent to a minimal envy-2 matching.

Suggested Citation

  • Kondratev, Aleksei Y. & Nesterov, Alexander S., 2022. "Minimal envy and popular matchings," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 296(3), pages 776-787.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:296:y:2022:i:3:p:776-787
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2021.03.060
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    Cited by:

    1. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Bó, Inácio, 2022. "Strategy-proof popular mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    2. Demeulemeester, Tom & Goossens, Dries & Hermans, Ben & Leus, Roel, 2023. "A pessimist’s approach to one-sided matching," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 305(3), pages 1087-1099.

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