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The equivalence between random priority and probabilistic serial rule on restricted preference domains

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  • Chen, Yajing
  • Jiao, Zhenhua
  • Zhao, Fang

Abstract

We study the outcome equivalence between the random priority (RP) rule and the probabilistic serial (PS) rule on restricted preference domains. For random assignment problems defined on restricted tier domains, the following three statements are equivalent: (i) The RP rule is outcome equivalent to the PS rule; (ii) On each tier consisting of two objects all agents except one have the same preferences over objects in such tier; (iii) The RP rule is ordinally efficient. For problems defined on the universal domain, we provide a sufficient condition for the outcome equivalence of the RP rule and the PS rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Yajing & Jiao, Zhenhua & Zhao, Fang, 2025. "The equivalence between random priority and probabilistic serial rule on restricted preference domains," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 251(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:251:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525001569
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112319
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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