Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-des/2020-10-05.html
Report NEP-DES-2020-10-05
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Komal Malik & Debasis Mishra, 2020, "Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2009.12114, Sep.
- Somouaoga Bonkoungou & Alexander Nesterov, 2020, "Reforms meet fairness concerns in school and college admissions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2009.05245, Sep, revised Sep 2024.
- Samuel Dooley & John P. Dickerson, 2020, "The Affiliate Matching Problem: On Labor Markets where Firms are Also Interested in the Placement of Previous Workers," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2009.11867, Sep.
- Itai Ashlagi & Mark Braverman & Amin Saberi & Clayton Thomas & Geng Zhao, 2020, "Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank is Proportional to Popularity," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2009.05124, Sep, revised Jan 2021.
- Jun Zhang, 2020, "Strategy-proof allocation with outside option," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2009.05311, Sep, revised Jan 2021.
- Modibo Camara & Jason Hartline & Aleck Johnsen, 2020, "Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2009.05518, Sep.
- Christos Papadimitriou & Kiran Vodrahalli & Mihalis Yannakakis, 2020, "The Platform Design Problem," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2009.06117, Sep, revised Jul 2021.
- Matthew J. Walker & Elena Katok & Jason Shachat, 2020, "Trust and Trustworthiness in Procurement Contracts with Retainage," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 20-34.