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Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions

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  • Gilbert Laffond
  • Jean Lainé
  • Jean-François Laslier

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & Jean-François Laslier, 1996. "Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(1), pages 75-93, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:1:p:75-93
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00179100
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Laffond G. & Laslier J. F. & Le Breton M., 1993. "The Bipartisan Set of a Tournament Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 182-201, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Laslier, Jean-Francois, 1996. "Rank-based choice correspondences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 279-286, September.
    2. Chevaleyre, Yann & Lang, Jérôme & Maudet, Nicolas & Monnot, Jérôme & Xia, Lirong, 2012. "New candidates welcome! Possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 74-88.
    3. Jean-François Laslier & Karine Straeten, 2016. "Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 559-587, October.
    4. Semih Koray & Arkadii Slinko, 2008. "Self-selective social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 129-149, June.
    5. Lainé, Jean, 2015. "Hyper-stable collective rankings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 70-80.
    6. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 1-38, January.
    7. Borm, Peter & van den Brink, Rene & Levinsky, Rene & Slikker, Marco, 2004. "On two new social choice correspondences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 51-68, January.
    8. Jean-François Laslier & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2015. "Strategic Voting under Committee Approval: A Theory," Working Papers halshs-01168767, HAL.
    9. SLINKO, Arkadii & KORAY, Semih, 2006. "Self-Selective Social Choice Functions," Cahiers de recherche 2006-21, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    10. Jean-François Laslier & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2016. "Strategic Voting in Multi-Winner Elections with Approval Balloting: A Theory for Large Electorates," Working Papers halshs-01304688, HAL.
    11. Rosa Camps & Xavier Mora & Laia Saumell, 2013. "A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1111-1142, April.
    12. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2009. "Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(2), pages 317-333, February.
    13. Jean-François Laslier & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2015. "Strategic Voting under Committee Approval: A Theory," PSE Working Papers halshs-01168767, HAL.
    14. Jean-François Laslier, 2011. "And the loser is... Plurality Voting," Working Papers hal-00609810, HAL.
    15. Lang, Jrme & Xia, Lirong, 2009. "Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 304-324, May.
    16. Jobst Heitzig & Forest Simmons, 2012. "Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 43-57, January.
    17. Z. Emel Ozturk, 2017. "A composition-consistency characterization of the plurality rule," Working Papers 2017_04, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    18. Laffond, Gilbert & Laine, Jean, 2000. "Representation in majority tournaments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 35-53, January.

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