IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/matsoc/v53y2007i3p239-254.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions

Author

Listed:
  • Maus, Stefan
  • Peters, Hans
  • Storcken, Ton

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 239-254, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:53:y:2007:i:3:p:239-254
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-4896(07)00022-4
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peter Fristrup & Hans Keiding, 1998. "Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 455-467.
    2. Arkadii Slinko, 2002. "On Asymptotic Strategy-Proofness of Classical Social Choice Rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(4), pages 389-398, June.
    3. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    4. Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216.
    5. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2009. "Gains from manipulating social choice rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(3), pages 349-371, September.
    2. Bednay, Dezső & Moskalenko, Anna & Tasnádi, Attila, 2019. "Dictatorship versus manipulability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 72-76.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Minimal manipulability: Unanimity and nondictatorship," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(6), pages 675-691, August.
    2. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2021. "A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design," ECON - Working Papers 393, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Yuliya A. Veselova, 2020. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 523-548, June.
    4. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January.
    5. Cato, Susumu, 2011. "Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 56-59, January.
    6. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier.
    7. Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    8. Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2010. "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1648-1674, September.
    9. Abraham Neyman & Tim Russo, 2006. "Public Goods and Budget Deficit," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000182, UCLA Department of Economics.
    10. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2020. "Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 237-258, March.
    11. Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Stephen Morris, 2012. "The Robustness of Robust Implementation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 10, pages 357-373, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    12. Lok, R.B. & Romero Morales, D. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2005. "The agents-are-substitutes property in continuous generalized assignment problems," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    13. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2012. "Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(4), pages 791-808, November.
    14. Bednay, Dezső & Moskalenko, Anna & Tasnádi, Attila, 2019. "Dictatorship versus manipulability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 72-76.
    15. Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 533-544, July.
    16. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2006. "The Limits of ex post Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 585-610, May.
    17. Csekő, Imre, 1996. "Választás és mechanizmus. Felületes ismerkedés az implementációelmélettel [Selection and mechanism. Getting superficially acquainted with the implementation theory]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(5), pages 420-430.
    18. Kalai, Ehud & Ledyard, John O., 1998. "Repeated Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 308-317, December.
    19. Hammond, Peter J, 2018. "Allocation Mechanisms, Incentives, and Endemic Institutional Externalities," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1162, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    20. Hans Peters & Souvik Roy & Ton Storcken, 2012. "On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 399-429, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:53:y:2007:i:3:p:239-254. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.