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An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities

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  • ANDERSSON, Tommy
  • EHLERS, Lars

Abstract

We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked allocations. This note provides an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.

Suggested Citation

  • ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars, 2013. "An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities," Cahiers de recherche 2013-12, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2013-12
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/10313
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stefan Maus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2007. "Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 247-269, September.
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    8. Velez, Rodrigo A., 2011. "Are incentives against economic justice?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 326-345, January.
    9. , & , & ,, 2014. "Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(3), September.
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    11. Alkan, Ahmet & Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1991. "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1023-1039, July.
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    13. Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2014. "Least manipulable Envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 43-49.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rodrigo A. Velez, 2017. "Equitable rent division," Working Papers 20170818-001, Texas A&M University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Least manipulable envy-free rules; algorithm;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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