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Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

  • Azacis, Helmuts

I consider the problem of assigning agents to indivisible objects, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy-free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium the set of true envy-free allocations.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 62 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 140-154

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:62:y:2008:i:1:p:140-154
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Claus-Jochen Haake & Matthias G. Raith & Francis Edward Su, 2002. "Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 723-749.
  2. Alkan, Ahmet & Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1991. "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1023-39, July.
  3. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-72, August.
  4. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2002. "Room Assignment-Rent Division: A Market Approach," Game Theory and Information 0202003, EconWPA, revised 26 Sep 2002.
  5. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2001. "Competitive Fair Division," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 418-443, April.
  6. Tadenuma Koichi & Thomson William, 1995. "Games of Fair Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 191-204, May.
  7. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 1983. "Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 939-54, July.
  8. Leonard, Herman B, 1983. "Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 461-79, June.
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