Room Assignment-Rent Division: A Market Approach
A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.
|Date of creation:||13 Feb 2002|
|Date of revision:||26 Sep 2002|
|Note:||Type of Document - Adobe pdf; prepared on IBM PC - PC- TEX/Scientific WorkPlace;|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://220.127.116.11|
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