Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design
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- Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2016.
"Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A market design approach,"
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- Andersson , Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson , Lars-Gunnar, 2015. "Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach," Working Papers 2015:12, Lund University, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Public housing; existing tenants; equilibrium; minimum equilibrium prices; maximum trade; group non-manipulability; dynamic price process;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2014-10-22 (Game Theory)
- NEP-URE-2014-10-22 (Urban and Real Estate Economics)
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