Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders
This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called "sets in excess demand" is introduced, and the main results demonstrate that a simple ascending auction always terminates at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices if and only if the selection belongs to this family. The paper also specifies a number of properties of the family of sets in excess demand and relate previously proposed selections to it.
|Date of creation:||17 Dec 2010|
|Date of revision:||28 Jun 2012|
|Publication status:||Forthcoming as Andersson, Tommy, Christer Andersson and Adolphus Johannes Jan Talman, 'Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders' in Annals of Operations Research, 2013.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden|
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/en
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References listed on IDEAS
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Other publications TiSEM
3e249b02-c0f4-4ccf-bd37-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Mishra, Debasis & Talman, Dolf, 2010. "Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 6-20, January.
- Debasis Mishra & Dolf Talman, 2008. "Characterization of the walrasian equilibria of the assignment model," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 08-07, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
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"Room Assignment-Rent Division: A Market Approach,"
Game Theory and Information
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- Tommy Andersson & Christer Andersson, 2012. "Properties of the DGS-Auction Algorithm," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 39(2), pages 113-133, February.
- Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 1983. "Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 939-54, July.
- Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2006.
"Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited,"
2006:11, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 12 Apr 2007.
- Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2008. "Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 350-354, November.
- Gabrielle Demange & David Gale, 1985.
"The Strategy Structure of Two Sided Matching Markets,"
- Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1985. "The Strategy Structure of Two-sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 873-88, July.
- Alkan, Ahmet & Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1991. "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1023-39, July.
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