Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders
This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called "sets in excess demand" is introduced, and the main results demonstrate that a simple ascending auction always terminates at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices if and only if the selection belongs to this family. The paper also specifies a number of properties of the family of sets in excess demand and relate previously proposed selections to it.
|Date of creation:||17 Dec 2010|
|Date of revision:||28 Jun 2012|
|Publication status:||Forthcoming as Andersson, Tommy, Christer Andersson and Adolphus Johannes Jan Talman, 'Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders' in Annals of Operations Research, 2013.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden|
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/en
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Other publications TiSEM
3e249b02-c0f4-4ccf-bd37-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Mishra, Debasis & Talman, Dolf, 2010. "Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 6-20, January.
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