Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint
I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.
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