Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules
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References listed on IDEAS
- Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2009. "Gains from manipulating social choice rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(3), pages 349-371, September.
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- Qi, Shaofang, 2014. "On the universally beneficial manipulation conjecture," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 229-232.
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KeywordsSocial choice rules; Manipulations; Gains; Losses; D70; D71;
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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